We re-examine the link between changes in housing wealth, financial wealth, and consumer spending. We extend a panel of U.S. states observed quarterly during the seventeen-year period, 1982 through 1999, to the thirty-one year period, 1978 through 2009. Using techniques reported previously, we impute the aggregate value of owneroccupied housing, the value of financial assets, and measures of aggregate consumption for each of the geographic units over time. We estimate regression models in levels, first differences and in error-correction form, relating per capita consumption to per capita income and wealth. We find a statistically significant and rather large effect of housing wealth upon household consumption. This effect is consistently larger than the effect of stock market wealth upon consumption. This reinforces the conclusions reported in our previous analysis.
I. Introduction
In the winter of 2000-2001, we made presentations at several professional meetings in which we sought to link household consumption expenditures to incomes and wealth, by relying on aggregate panel data on U.S. states and fourteen different countries.
A formal paper was ultimately presented at the Summer Institute of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in July of 2001, and it was circulated as an NBER working paper (#8606) that fall.
That research attempted to measure average consumption, income, housing wealth, and stock market wealth over time for U.S. states and foreign countries. The statistical relationship between consumption, income and wealth was estimated using standard multivariate techniques, and we interpreted the coefficients of the wealth variables as indicating the strength of the association between these two kinds of household wealth and household consumption.
Our statistical results suggested that there were significant "wealth effects" upon consumption associated with both types of wealth, housing wealth and financial wealth, but that the stimulatory effects of housing wealth substantially exceeded the effects of financial wealth. This result persisted for a variety of specifications for both panels of aggregate data.
These results received some notice in the popular media, 1 in some part, presumably, reflecting concurrent trends in the macro economy. In due course, the paper, When our paper was originally presented, it relied upon the most recent data available. (The paper was first presented in January 2000, and it relied upon data through the second quarter of 1999). By the time the research was published, five years had elapsed, and by the time of the disastrous meltdown in mortgage markets, more than seven years had elapsed.
The purpose of this paper is to update the empirical analysis using data through 2009, and thus to incorporate the past decade of unusual volatility in housing wealth, stock market wealth, and personal consumption. As before, we present a variety of econometric models linking consumption to income, housing wealth, and stock market wealth. As in our previous analysis, we make no effort to "deduce" a structural model reflecting these relationships, preferring again to observe the robustness of these relationships to plausible specifications of the association.
In attempting to update our previous analysis, it was immediately apparent that comparable data from the panel of OECD countries previously analyzed could not be obtained. Hence, this analysis is confined to quarterly data on U.S. states, 1978:I-2009 :II, extending our previous work which had analyzed these macro forces during 1982:I-1999:II.
The principal results and interpretations in our previous work are largely unchanged, but the estimated magnitudes are larger and more important statistically and also economically. When the more recent volatile period is included in the analysis, we find that the relationship between housing market wealth and consumption is a good bit stronger, relative to the link between stock market wealth and consumption. This key finding is robust to a variety of reasonable specifications. One set of previous findings
does not seem to hold up to replication -certainly not as strongly as during the earlier period. Previously, we noted an asymmetry in the association between housing market wealth and consumption. When housing market wealth was increasing, household consumption was increasing. But when housing market wealth declined, household consumption declined only marginally. For the most part, this asymmetry is absent from the longer panel which now includes substantially more variation in asset prices, notably periods of declining house prices and declining stock market indices.
In Section II below we review the conceptual and measurement issues addressed in the original research paper, and we discuss our efforts to extend the time series for analysis. We also describe recent trends in housing wealth, stock market wealth, and household consumption.
Section III extends the empirical models relating consumption to housing wealth and stock market wealth. Section IV presents our conclusions briefly and reflects on their significance.
II. Wealth Effects and Consumption
It has been widely observed that changes in the values of financial assets are associated with changes in national consumption. In regression models relating changes in log consumption to changes in log stock market wealth, the estimated relationship is generally positive and statistically significant. Under a standard interpretation of these results, from a suitably specified regression, the coefficient measures the "wealth effect" --the causal effect of exogenous changes in wealth upon consumption behavior.
There is every reason to expect that changes in housing wealth exert effects upon household behavior that are quite analogous to those found for financial wealth. Yet until our work a decade ago, there was virtually no comparative research on this issue. As is evident from the events of the past half decade, the housing wealth effect may have become especially important, as institutional innovations (for example, second mortgages in the form of secured lines of credit, and option-ARM first-mortgage contracts) made it as simple to extract cash from housing equity as it was to sell shares or to borrow on margin.
Our previous paper summarizes the extensive theoretical and empirical rationale for wealth effects, and we do not repeat this summary here. However, two arguments have recurred and should be acknowledged. The first, a general point, was made by Glaeser in his comments on Case (2000) . The claim is essentially that, since a house is both an asset and a necessary part of outlays, when the value of a house increases there is little or no welfare gain. 2 Glaeser's comments were in part motivated by a comment made in a speech by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (November 2, 1999) in which he stated that "The permanent increase in spending out of housing wealth is somewhat 2 Glaeser reminds us of the result from elementary price theory that if a rational individual has already purchased the desired housing (so that the endowment point equals the consumption point) then price changes in either direction are utility improving. (The household can always continue to consume the same bundle that it did before the change, but the price change has opened up new opportunities.) But we cannot infer, when comparing general equilibria, that any price change is unambiguously welfare improving --not without understanding the exogenous shocks that produced the change. A transcript of the debate can be found in the discussion following the paper by Karl Case (2000) . A fuller discussion of the complex issues surrounding housing wealth effects can be found in our previous paper (2005 Case (2006) estimates a virtually identical aggregate figure, but he then shows that roughly half of the increase came in the form of new capital (buildings and improvements) and half in the form of increases in the value of land, particularly land on the coasts. Over the course of five years, this would imply that the free cash and credit extracted with the home as collateral was roughly $3.5 trillion compared to a total of $5 trillion in total appreciation, net of improvement. Given the magnitude of these flows and the general failure at the time to recognize them as part of a credit bubble, it is hard to imagine that the build-up in home equity when and were it occurred did not encourage aggregate spending there and then.
Nor that the bust in home prices did not discourage spending.
III. Housing Prices: 1978 -2001
We use regional (state level) data to identify the wealth effect to exploit the fact that home prices have evolved very differently in different parts of the country. This arises largely from differences in the elasticity of land supply, the performance of regional economies, and the changing demographics of states.
The expanded data set described below adds information on the years 1978-1981 and 2000-2009 . These periods include the two most serious recessions since the Great Depression. The time period also spans the longest expansion in U. S. history, 1991-2001. In fact, as reported in Figure 1 , between 1983 and 2000 there were only two quarters of negative growth, both in 1990.
The steady performance of the national economy contributed to a housing market that had almost never experienced price declines, at least not since 1975. The behavior of home prices since 1975 is chronicled in detail in Case (2008) and Quigley (2008, 2010) . Here we review a few salient facts. percent, and a bottom was not reached for twenty quarters. Some areas fared even worse;
in San Diego prices fell seventeen percent and did not hit bottom for 24 quarters.
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IV. Measurement Issues: The Data
The data set for U.S. states exploits the fact that the distribution of increases and decreases in housing values has been anything but uniform across regions in the U.S., and variations in stock market wealth have been quite unequally distributed across households geographically. The panel offers the advantage that data definitions and institutions are uniform across geographical units. In addition, the extension reported here greatly increases the sample size for analysis, by seventy percent when compared to our previous analysis, from 3,700 observations on state-by-quarter-year to 6,300 observations.
A. Housing Wealth
Estimates of housing market wealth were constructed from repeat sales price indexes applied to the base values reported in the 2000 Census of Population and
Housing by state. Weighted repeat sales (WRS) indexes (see Shiller, 1987, 1989) 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993 , also aggregated to the nine census regions.
In the one year common to the two bodies of data, 1989, the simple correlation between the two series is 0.934; the correlations are also quite high among the data for other years which do not match. The t-ratios associated with these correlations are large, but of course, the sample sizes are small. (This is discussed in our previous paper.)
Figures 8 through 10 present the raw data for several states after conversion to per capita terms and deflation using the CPI. The left-hand scale is income, housing wealth, and financial wealth per capita in 1983 dollars. The right hand scale measures retail sales in 1983 dollars.
V. Statistical Results
Tables 3 through 7 report various econometric specifications of the relationship between income, wealth, and consumption for U.S. states. All specifications include fixed effects (i.e., a set of dummy variables for each state). These models formed the core of our original analysis. Model I is the basic specification representing the effects of both housing and stock market wealth upon consumption. We also include two other specifications, to explore further the nature of estimated wealth effects and their robustness. Model II for each specification also includes state-specific time trends. Model III includes year-specific fixed effects as well as seasonal (i.e., quarterly) fixed effects. $140,000 $80,000 $80,000 Note that, when interpreting the estimated coefficients for wealth in Model III, the effects of an overall change in stock market wealth on consumption are controlled for in the regressions. Thus, in Model III the estimated wealth coefficients reflect only interregional differences in the growth of wealth. Table 3 presents basic relationships between per capita consumption, income, and the two measures of wealth. As the table indicates, in the simplest formulation, the estimated effect of housing market wealth on consumption is significant and large. In the ordinary least squares regressions, the estimated elasticity is between 0.06 and 0.20. In contrast, the estimated effects of financial wealth upon consumption are a good bit smaller. In the simpler OLS model, the estimate ranges between 0.04 and 0.06. These magnitudes are much larger than the elasticities reported in our earlier paper.
When the model is extended to allow for first-order serial correlation, the estimated elasticities for income and for stock market wealth are generally smaller. 3 But the estimated elasticities for housing market wealth remain large --0.12 to 0.15.
The table also reports the t-ratio for the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficient estimates measuring housing and financial market effects is zero. A formal test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth is equal to that of stock market wealth (against the alternative hypothesis that the two coefficients differ) is presented, as well as a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth exceeds the coefficient on financial wealth. The evidence suggests that housing market wealth has a more important effect on consumption than does financial wealth. This is the Note:
* All variables are real (deflated by GDP deflator) measured per capita in logarithms, stock market and housing market variables are seasonally adjusted; all models include fixed effects by states. Absolute value of t ratios are in parentheses.
H 0 is a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth is equal to that of stock market wealth.
H 1 is a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth exceeds that of stock market wealth.
same qualitative result reported and discussed in our earlier work, but the statistical significance of the comparison is much larger with the richer panel of data on states. Table 4 presents results with all variables expressed as first differences. In the ordinary least squares formulation, the coefficient on housing market wealth is significant in all specifications and is five or six times as large as the coefficient on financial wealth.
Consumption changes are significantly dependent on changes in income and both forms of wealth, housing wealth and stock market wealth. Table 3 also presents the same firstdifference equation when all three models are estimated using a simple instrumentalvariables approach, relying upon lags in income and wealth as instruments for current income and wealth. In these regressions, the income elasticity is estimated to be a good bit larger, as is the elasticity of housing market wealth in two of the three specifications.
Surprisingly, the estimated coefficient for stock market wealth has a negative sign.
4 Table 5 presents the model in first differences including the lagged (log) ratio of consumption to income. This is the error-correction model (ECM) often employed in the presence of unit roots. 5 The model represents a co-integrated relation between consumption and income, where income includes that derived from the stock market and housing. Note that the lagged ratio of consumption to income has a coefficient that is negative and significant in all regressions. Thus, transitory shocks, arising from changes in other variables in the model or the error term in the regression, will have an immediate effect on consumption but will eventually be offset, unless the shocks are ultimately confirmed by income changes. Again, the results support the highly significant H 0 is a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth is equal to that of stock market wealth.
immediate effect of housing market wealth upon consumption; the effect is especially large relative to that of financial wealth.
In Table 6 , we introduce a lagged stock market response within the ECM framework. There are certainly reasons to expect some time lags: household inattention, evaluation of household finances only at periodic intervals (such as annual tax reporting times), adjustment costs to changing consumption, and habit formation. Some of these reasons are confirmed by survey data on individual consumers' decisions. Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1997) found that households have only imperfect knowledge of their own 0.000 0.000 0.000 p-value for H1
1.000 1.000 1.000
Note:
* See also note to Table 2. H 0 is a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth is equal to that of stock market wealth. H 1 is a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth exceeds that of stock market wealth.
financial wealth, and Buck and Pence (2008) report that a great many homeowners do not know the basic terms of their mortgages. Dynan and Maki (2001) have presented evidence using household data that the stock market wealth effect, to the extent that it is measurable, operates as lagged adjustment process. We amend our preferred specification to add a lagged term in the regressions. We do not include lags on household housing wealth, given the strong serial correlation of home price changes. 6 The results reported in Table 6 , including the lagged change in the stock market wealth variable, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5 . The estimated effect of housing wealth is substantially stronger in Table 6 , as is the estimated effect of income and stock market wealth. For Models I and II (which exclude year-specific fixed effects) the sum of the coefficients on stock market wealth is generally positive, but these effects are generally statistically insignificant.
In our earlier paper, we also investigated the importance of simple demographics -the age distribution of the state populations -since theory implies that the wealth effect should be different at different phases of the life cycle. We relied upon estimates of the age distribution produced annually by the CPS since 1982. We computed the fraction of the population aged sixty or above by state and year and interpolated to quarters. We added interaction terms to the regressions reported in Table 6 , in an effort to estimate how the wealth effect is affected by age. The estimated age-interaction-effect variables were not statistically significant, and regressions extending these non-results are omitted here.
7
Due to changes in savings and tax institutions, we anticipate that the importance of the housing wealth effect may have changed over time. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) greatly advantaged the use of housing equity for consumption (by eliminating the tax deductibility of all other interest payments for consumer credit). Passage of the act greatly encouraged financial institutions to establish lines of credit secured by home equity, beginning in the fourth quarter of 1986. Even if homeowners did not plan to Campbell and Cocco (2004) , using data on individual households, did find evidence that the housing wealth effect is higher for older households. 
H 0 is a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth is equal to that of stock market wealth. H 1 is a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth exceeds that of stock market wealth.
access their home equity for consumption, their knowledge of the possibility may diminish the precautionary saving motive, a motive which has been shown to be an important determinant of consumption expenditures (Kennickell and Lusardi, 2004) . Table 7 presents variants of our preferred statistical models, the first differences and the ECM models, for the panel of U.S. states. In these regressions, we distinguish between the potential effects of housing wealth on consumption before and after the last quarter of 1986. In four of the six specifications, the estimated effects of housing market wealth upon consumption are substantially larger after the passage of TRA86. The point estimates are between two and ten times larger after the change in the tax law, and these differences are highly significant statistically. The comparisons are hardly definitive, and in two of the three specifications, they merely interpret a specific intercept shift. But they are quite suggestive.
Finally, some evidence suggests that housing consumers may react differently to perceived increases in housing values as compared to perceived declines in asset values. Genesove and Mayer (2001) have shown that home sellers behave differently, as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory, in reaction to declines in home prices, than in reaction to increases. Apparently the painful regret due to loss of home value has different psychological consequences than does the pleasant elation due to increase in home value, which frees up new opportunities to consume home equity. Table 8 provides additional evidence, using the same preferred models. (This is the specification we reported in Appendix Table 3 of the original paper.) * See also note to Table 2. H 0 is a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth is the same before and after 1986. * See also note to Table 2. H 0 is a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on housing market wealth is the same for increases as it is for decreases.
For each of the six regressions, the results indicate that increases in housing market wealth have had positive effects upon household consumption, but declines in housing market wealth have had negative and somewhat larger effects upon consumption.
In four of the six comparisons, the increase in consumption associated with increases in housing market wealth is significantly less than the decrease in consumption associated with decreases in housing wealth.
These results were not found in our original analysis based on data through 1999.
Presumably, this difference reflects the importance of the recent meltdown in the asset market for housing.
Appendix Table 1 compares the effects upon consumption of both increases and decreases in housing market and stock market wealth simultaneously. In each of the six models reported in the table, the effect of increases in housing market wealth upon consumption is positive and significant; the effect of decreases in housing market wealth upon consumption is negative and is also significantly larger.
In contrast, the statistical models report essentially no relationship between increases in stock market wealth and increases in consumption, but they do report a small and statistically significant relationship between decreases in stock market wealth and decreases in consumption.
As emphasized in our original paper, there is always room for skepticism about the estimation and interpretation of simple macroeconomic structural relations such as those presented here. (See, for example, Cooley and Leroy, 1981, or Leamer, 1983.) Underlying our analysis is an assumption that it is useful to think of causality as running from wealth components to consumption, and not that, for example, the two are determined by some third variable, such as general confidence in the economy. We believe even more strongly that these new results demonstrate that it is useful to think of consumption as determined in accordance with the models we have presented. In consulting this evidence, recall that our measure of housing wealth excludes wealth changes due to changes in the size or quality of homes, changes that are likely to be correlated with consumption changes merely because housing services are a component of consumption. We have alluded elsewhere to others' evidence using data on individuals that the reaction of consumption to stock market increases is stronger for stockholders than for non-stockholders (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991) , and that the reaction of consumption to housing price increases is stronger for homeowners than for renters. This lends additional credibility to our structural models when compared to a model that postulates that general confidence determines both consumption and asset prices.
VI. Conclusion
The importance of housing market wealth and financial wealth in affecting consumption is an empirical matter. We have examined this wealth effect with a reasonably long panel of cross-sectional time-series data, one that is more comprehensive than any applied before, and with a number of different econometric specifications.
There is some question about how much we can generalize for the future from the additional information provided by the recent meltdown. On the one hand, the meltdown is historically very unusual, and part of the consumption behavior may reflect factors special to that time. Regulators are now hard at work trying to correct some of these special factors. On the other hand, the meltdown provides us the first opportunity actually to observe large price declines, and so this period ought to be indispensable to any analysis of housing wealth effects.
The numerical results vary somewhat with different econometric specifications, and so any numerical conclusion must be tentative. We find at best weak evidence of a link between stock market wealth and consumption. In contrast, we do find strong evidence that variations in housing market wealth have important effects upon consumption. This evidence arises consistently using thirty-one year panels of U.S.
states, and this finding is robust to differences in model specification.
As for the magnitude of the effects, consider a few of the most recent changes in billion. Either has a large impact on the economy; together they have a very large impact.
These calculations should not imply a false precision in the interpretation of our econometric models. Nevertheless, they do reinforce our conclusion that changes in housing values continue to exert a larger and more important impact upon household consumption than do changes in stock market values. 
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